by Carl Michael
Carl Michael takes a long view of Belt and Road Initiative in his final blog post for our Emerging Fellows program in 2020. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the APF or its other members. The first seven sections in this series used an inductive foresight process to build future constructs using a multiple horizons and timeline approach. In the last four sections however, four future scenarios were presented using a deductive futures approach based on two axes of uncertainty. As we know from experience the dynamics driving future scenarios are far more complex than that. Therefore, the aim of this section is to zoom out to the bigger, arguably more profound long-term image of the future in relation to the BRI as we consider the turbulence of the present and its interplay with short-term future realities. As a prominent global initiative, the BRI has a highly visible structure, this makes its future state open to a great deal of conjecture. With a ten-thousand-day perspective, what is yet to be discerned are the details, including how much China will maintain its centrality and how much genuine value it will provide to other nations in the long term. This relates to the image of the future that is driving the BRI, the extent to which it does so, and how much of that image of the future will prevail in 2050 in order to sustain the BRI for the remainder of the 21st Century. To a great extent, the BRI reflects the collective striving of society toward valued future objectives, driven by a particular image of the future. Like all images of the future, this can change over time through a capacity for self-correction, re-architecture and renewal. If that capacity is inadequate, the necessary constructive and idealistic images for the desired future may not materialise and this has the potential to destroy trust and instead propel fears about the BRI. At the heart of the BRI is the historical ‘Belt’ and at the heart of the ‘Belt’ is a driving image of the future comprising the grand logic of Eurasian integration, the place of a resurgent China in the world order, unceasing technological innovation and an ever expanding technocracy. As the world’s largest developing country, China believes it can provide other developing countries with an alternative model for development which is manifested in the BRI. Whether the BRI continues as a viable geo-economic image of the future for the world or becomes a geopolitical hegemony of China over the participating countries is uncertain. Despite current circumstances, it is still too early to draw any firm conclusion. Hindsight suggests that major transformations in the global system occur due to hegemonic conflict. The durability of the central institutions of the current global political economy has been disrupted by the distributive global model of the BRI, which incorporates an incentivising approach that is non-judgemental about member nations’ political systems. The BRI has been used by China to reframe its relationships with other nations and to provide historical legitimacy for a China-centric Pan-Asian narrative, which accepts no pushback, especially from those who possess equally strong civilisational and historical narratives. Over the next ten-thousand days the BRI has the opportunity to enhance people-to-people connectivity, mitigate the risks from environmental stress, as well as promote cultural and material value exchange in an era of revolutionary technological advances. We need to remain vigilant about the actual long-term impact of the BRI on both participating and non-participating nations. For now, the central task of the BRI is to organise itself to address truly universal values and strive for an enduring global balance– through wisdom, ‘contingent adaptation’ and foresight; for as has been said, a balanced world is a world which is free. © Carl Michael 2020
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